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1. Introduction 
Common distinctions between “safe” and “risky” assets have been called into question 
following the Great Recession that affected global markets after 2007. The abnormally high 
credit spreads observed for a number of government securities in developed economies, 
previously considered virtually riskless, mark a paradigm shift in investors’ perceptions with 
profound implications for pricing, hedging and portfolio allocation strategies. The 2010-13 
European sovereign debt crisis offers the perfect setting to analyse the determinants of 
government bond returns and to study how the importance of these determinants changes 
over time. Specifically, an equity risk factor has long been used in the finance literature to 
explain government bond returns (Fama and French, 1993). It is well documented that, in 
crisis periods, government bonds and stocks exhibit negative co-movements, which result in 
a negative beta for the equity risk factor. When uncertainty is high, investors migrate away 
from stock markets and buy government bonds which are perceived to be safer (Connolly et 
al., 2005). However, with higher levels of sovereign default risk this flight-to-safety 
behaviour is no longer justified.  
We contribute to the literature in a number of ways. First, so far researchers have 
focused on a macro narrative to explain sign changes in stock-bond correlation over time 
(Campbell et al., 2016; David and Veronesi, 2013; Burkhardt and Hasseltoft, 2012; Ermolov, 
2015; Song, 2016). We offer another interpretative angle and conclude that stock-bond co-
movements respond to the level of sovereign credit risk. This measure complements the 
existing macro-interpretation as the level of sovereign risk can be seen as a synthesis of the 
factors that affect the sovereign’s macroeconomic profile (Gapen et al., 2008 and Gray et 
al., 2007). However, we show that this measure can prove more effective than key macro-
variables at capturing the switch in sign of stock-bond correlations observed during the 
sovereign crisis. It could also prove particularly useful in countries where readily available 
macro-indicators are few. Figure I gives a stylized description of our findings. We observe 
that the correlation between stock and government bond returns becomes positive for high 
risk countries at the start of the sovereign debt crisis. This suggests that bonds issued by 
governments with a poor credit profile behave more like equities rather than safe assets 
when economic conditions deteriorate. Specifically, we find that the critical threshold for 
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the stock-bond correlation to switch sign occurs when sovereign credit spreads go beyond 
2%. 
Campbell et al. (2015) provide further insights into stock-bond covariation and suggest 
that the monetary policy stance, in addition to macro-economic shocks, can be a 
contributing factor in the US market. However, interest rate policy cannot be a driving factor 
of the sign switch of stock-bond correlation within the Eurozone. This is because all the 
countries in the Eurozone are subject to the same central bank decisions, while the sign 
switch only occurs in a sub-group of these countries, that is, those with high sovereign risk. 
Hau and Lai (2016) point out that a common monetary policy in the Eurozone can still 
generate different asset allocation incentives in member countries due to differences in real 
rates. This is because of divergence in local inflation among Eurozone countries. When we 
control for local inflation levels we still find that sovereign risk is an important factor to 
explain stock-bond co-movements in high risk countries.  
Further, in response to the crisis, the European Central Bank (ECB) has used 
unconventional monetary policy measures (quantitative easing or QE) to boost government 
bond markets via direct bond purchases (Eser and Schwaab, 2016). QE would often lead to a 
positive stock market reaction. The resulting upward pressure in both stock and bond prices 
could contribute to positive stock-bond correlation. The evidence, however, rules out this 
explanation. Instead of observing positive stock and bond market returns in high risk 
countries during the first part of the sovereign crisis when stock-bond correlation turns 
positive, we see mostly negative returns in both markets. 
Our sovereign risk argument finds indirect support in the findings of Weigel and Gemmill 
(2006) who observe a positive relationship between stock markets and the distance to 
default of emerging economies. The implication is that in the countries with relatively high 
risk in their sample (Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela and Mexico) an increase in country risk and 
government bond yields leads to a fall in stocks. This generates a positive stock-bond 
relationship. Similar findings are obtained from a larger sample of emerging economies by 
Longstaff et al. (2011). An explanation of this positive relationship could come from the 
sovereign ceiling channel described by Almeida et al. (2016) whereby sovereign rating 
downgrades, resulting in lower bond prices, generate a deterioration of credit quality across 
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the private sector (i.e. lower stock prices).1 A similar impact on stock and bond prices would 
also be reached when it is the private sector that produces negative spillovers on the 
government’s creditworthiness. For instance, higher corporate default can bring about 
lower tax revenue and onerous bailout packages that can have serious consequences for 
public finances and sovereign default risk.2 Acharya et al. (2014) illustrate this point in the 
context of the Great Recession and bank bailouts. 
As a second contribution, our work documents a departure from the findings of earlier 
research that suggest positive stock-bond correlation to be associated with periods of 
stagflation, i.e. when inflation is countercyclical (Burkhardt and Hasseltoft, 2012; Campbell 
et al., 2016; Song, 2016). However, during the sovereign crisis, high risk European countries, 
whose government bonds exhibited positive equity betas, were characterised by a 
procyclical inflation scenario with low growth and low inflation.  
Our third contribution is an analysis of the portfolio allocation implications of our 
findings. The decoupling of the European sovereign bond market between high risk and low 
risk countries implies that sovereign bonds cannot be regarded as a homogenous asset 
class. As high risk sovereign bonds behave more like equities they no longer represent a 
hedge against stock market risk, no longer receive flight-to-safety funds, and their use for 
diversification purposes is profoundly altered. When looking at risk adjusted returns we 
reach the conclusion that indiscriminate diversification does not pay. It is best to diversify 
across low risk countries, with bond investments, equity investments or a mixture of the 
two. The upshot is that “prudent diversification” is a winning strategy both during crises and 
through the business cycle. Specifically, we observe that bonds from low risk countries 
appear to outperform all other portfolios considered across the crisis periods. This is due to 
particularly good risk adjusted returns during the subprime (2007-2009) and the first phase 
of the sovereign crisis (2010-2011) as they benefited from a flight-to-safety. However, low 
risk stocks appear to be the best through-the-cycle investment in risk adjusted terms. Given 
                                                        
1
 The positive relationship between the level of credit risk and the level of stock-bond correlation was also 
observed in the US corporate bond market. Blume et al. (1991) report a strong positive correlation between 
S&P500 stocks and high-yield corporate bonds (.52) during the 1980s. Investment grade and sovereign bonds 
are also positively correlated with stocks in that period but to a lower degree (.37 and .34 respectively). Reilly 
et al. (2009) show that, after the start of the new millennium, US investment grade corporate bonds become 
negatively related to the stock market. On the other hand, high yield corporate bonds remain positively 
related with the stock market throughout the sample period (1986-2009), an indication that these securities 
have consistently shown an “equity component” (Fridson, 1994). 
2
 We thank the referee for making this point.  
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these findings, it is not surprising that a “pension fund” strategy, which diversifies across 
low risk stocks and low risk bonds, generates good Sharpe ratios both over the crisis periods 
and through the cycle.  
Our fourth contribution is to show how the importance of credit and liquidity 
determinants varies across Euro-zone countries and between calm and crisis periods. We 
observe that market liquidity risk becomes statistically significant during the subprime and 
sovereign crisis periods. This is consistent with Beber et al. (2009) who conclude that credit 
risk usually accounts for the largest part of sovereign bond spreads but liquidity risk gains 
importance in times of market uncertainty. However, we find that liquidity risk does not 
affect countries indiscriminately, but only those that run into financial difficulties or are 
likely to be unable to service their debt. This establishes a plausible connection between 
liquidity and the level of credit risk faced by a sovereign (Pelizzon et al., 2016). We also show 
that credit risk does not appear to be priced before the subprime crisis but is important 
during the sovereign crisis. Interestingly, the influence of credit risk on bond returns 
drastically varies across countries. In low risk countries, the credit risk factor is positively 
related with bond returns. But, this relationship is negative and highly statistically significant 
in high risk countries. Hence, the empirical evidence strongly supports a flight-to-safety 
from high risk countries to low risk countries when sovereign default risk increases.  
In this paper we focus on observable risk factors of sovereign bond yield changes. A 
related strand of the literature has also investigated unobservable factors. Geyer et al. 
(2004) and Favero et al. (2010) find that EMU sovereign yield spreads are largely driven by 
an unobservable time-varying common factor. Riedel et al. (2013) show that sovereign yield 
spreads also depend on an unobservable endogenous sovereign credit cycle. More recently, 
Kinateder and Wagner (2016) estimate time-varying unobservable common shocks on EMU 
government bond yield changes while allowing for heterogeneous country effects. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Variables description and model 
specification are presented in Section 2. Section 3 provides details of our data. In Sections 4 
and 5 we discuss our results and robustness tests. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
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2. The model 
  To study the determinants of European government bond returns and their time 
varying behaviour we estimate the following panel regression model over four distinct time 
periods: pre-crisis, subprime crisis and the acute and recovery phases of the sovereign crisis: 
 
RB,, − RECB
= c + ω + βEQT, − RECB + β∆CDS, +	β∆Spr,, + ϵ,,	 
(1) 
where #$%,&',(  denotes the mid-price return for bond ) issued by country *+ on day ,, #-.$( 
represents the 3 month ECB yield, -/0&',(  is the country specific stock index 
return,	∆.12&',(  is the change in country specific 5 year CDS spreads,	∆23+%,&',( is the change 
in bond specific bid-ask spread, ω are bond fixed effects, and * is the constant. We use a 
(within) panel estimator and panel robust standard errors. Following Cameron and Trivedi 
(2005) fixed effects are captured by demeaning the dependent and explanatory variables at 
the bond level.
3
 To ensure that no extreme movements bias our results, all return and 
change variables employed throughout our analysis are winsorized at 1% - 99% considering 
all observations available, country by country, in each sub-period. All panel regressions are 
estimated with daily data.  
The above model is in the spirit of Fama and French (1993) with the addition of the bid-
ask spread variable to control for liquidity effects.4 However, differently from the original 
Fama and French model we do not explicitly consider a TERM factor. TERM is a proxy for 
maturity effects, or unexpected changes in interest rates, and is usually defined as the 
difference between a long-term government bond return and a short-term rate. The reason 
for its exclusion is that TERM is dominated by its first component, the long-term 
government bond return, which makes it undistinguishable from the dependent variable for 
bonds with long maturities. This severely impairs our ability to make any meaningful 
                                                        
3
 See Cameron and Trivedi (2005) pp. 697–706. 
4
 Other studies also use liquidity measures in the CAPM framework. For instance, Li et al. (2009) implement a 
similar approach when analysing the effect of market-wide liquidity in the US treasury market. 
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statistical inference regarding our main explanatory variables.5 Moreover, maturity effects 
tend to correlate with credit (and, to some extent, liquidity) effects which are already 
captured by our explanatory variables. In the robustness Section we also control for 
maturity effects by interacting the equity factor with maturity dummies and by employing 
duration adjusted bond excess returns. Our main findings remain unaltered.  
As a credit risk proxy we use the changes in 5 year CDS prices. Unlike credit ratings, 
which may be “sticky”, CDS contracts are traded daily and represent the creditworthiness of 
an entity as viewed by the market rather than a rating agency. One problem when using CDS 
spreads is that these instruments may not be an accurate measure of default risk. Blanco et 
al. (2005) offer evidence that CDS spreads are considerably larger than credit bond spreads 
for US and European investment grade bonds. In more recent work, Bongaerts et al. (2011) 
find significant and robust evidence of a liquidity factor in corporate CDSs. Tang and Yan 
(2008), Chen et al. (2013), and Corò et al. (2013) reach similar conclusions for the corporate 
CDS market. Although we are aware of this issue, we assume that the liquidity bias is 
smallest for the 5 year CDS contract, as it is the most traded maturity (Gyntelberg et al., 
2013).  
The liquidity variable ∆23+ represents changes in bond specific proportional bid-ask 
spreads. Darbha and Dufour (2015) implement a horserace between several liquidity proxies 
on Eurozone sovereign bond markets and conclude that the proportional bid-ask spread is 
the most effective in capturing the variation of bond yields. Although our analysis examines 
bond returns instead of yields, we also expect the bid-ask spread to provide the best 
representation of illiquidity throughout our sample.  
3. Data 
In this study, we use a comprehensive database of tick-by-tick tradable prices for 
European government bonds provided by the MTS intra-dealer platform of the London 
Stock Exchange. MTS comprises bond information from 18 local cash markets and the 
European Benchmark Market, or EuroMTS, where only Euro benchmark bonds are traded.6 
Euro benchmark bonds must have an outstanding value of at least €5 billion (Dufour and 
                                                        
5
 See Section 5.4 for a more detailed discussion regarding the TERM factor. 
6
 As of May 2014, available Euro denominated bond cash markets include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. The other seven cash markets are Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Israel, Poland, Slovenia, and United Kingdom. 
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Skinner, 2004) and their quotes can be submitted simultaneously to both the local cash 
platform and EuroMTS. With an average daily turnover of more than €100 billion as of mid-
2014, MTS provides the best data source for the analysis of European government bonds.7 
More information regarding the market microstructure of the MTS platforms is presented in 
Cheung et al. (2005) and Dunne et al. (2006) whereas the price discovery mechanisms are 
discussed in Dufour and Nguyen (2011) and Caporale and Girardi (2013).
8
 Beber et al. (2009) 
use the MTS data to construct bond liquidity and order flow measures. 
Starting in April 2003, MTS Time Series offers high frequency historical bond data that 
contain the best three bid and ask prices together with their corresponding tradable sizes, 
and complete information regarding executed trades. Quote updates have time stamps with 
millisecond precision and, starting in 2013, with microsecond precision. We consider only 
the information for the best bid and ask prices throughout the analysis. Our sample covers a 
period of more than 10 years, from April 2003 to December 2013, and includes 562 
government bonds that belong to 11 Euro-zone countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. All selected bonds are 
fixed-coupon benchmark bonds, have a maximum time to maturity of 51 years and trade on 
both the local cash market and EuroMTS.9  
As is the case with any high frequency dataset, some steps are required to clean the 
data before they can be used in the analysis:  
i. We select only quotes and trades recorded when the market is open, between 
8:15 AM and 5:30 PM Central European Time (CET).  
ii. Quote information from both the local market and EuroMTS is consolidated to 
form a new order book. We then use the consolidated order book to obtain the 
bond mid-price available at 5:00 PM CET each day.10 
                                                        
7
 For a comparison between MTS and other electronic platforms on European government bonds see Dunne et 
al. (2006), Persaud (2006) and ECB (2004, 2007). 
8
 Also see Albanesi and Rindi (2000) for the evolution and market microstructure of MTS Italy, the institutional 
design model for EuroMTS and all other MTS cash markets. 
9
 It is worth mentioning that bonds become benchmark bonds when the issue size criterion is met. As a result, 
a bond need not be a benchmark bond when issued, but can gain the benchmark status at a later date. This 
happens because some bonds are sold on the primary market in several tranches or tap sales. It is at the time 
when the bond receives the benchmark status that the bond starts trading on EuroMTS. We include in our 
analysis only the time period after the bond has received the Euro benchmark flag.  
10
 Note that from the end of 2011 quotes for Greek bonds are no longer available on the MTS platform.  Also, 
from 1st Jan 2010, we use the Composite Bloomberg Bond Trader (CBBT) mid-prices for Portuguese bonds 
  
 
10 
 
iii. All quote updates that have a bid price higher than or equal to the ask price are 
eliminated.  
iv. We also address the issue of extremely high intraday bid-ask spreads by using a 
bond specific filter. The filter is applied each year and excludes the top 1% bid-
ask spreads for each bond. This filter removes extreme and untradeable quote 
revisions without hindering the informational content of the order book.  
We build our daily liquidity proxy for each bond as the average of all intra-day 
proportional bid-ask spreads weighted by the length of time each spread is displayed in the 
order book. For our credit risk factor we use daily 5 year CDS prices from Bloomberg. The 
CDS data is sourced from Credit Market Analysis (CMA) as the average of New York and 
London daily close prices.
11
 To illustrate how our liquidity and credit variables behave 
through time, Figure II shows the daily 5 year CDS spreads and average proportional bid-ask 
spreads for the 11 countries considered. Key crisis events are marked by spikes in our daily 
aggregate measures of credit and liquidity in each country. For the equity factor we employ 
daily stock index data from Datastream. Finally, our proxy for the risk-free rate is the 3 
month ECB AAA yield. The ECB reports this measure daily starting from 6th September 2004. 
To obtain constant maturity yields, the ECB uses a Svensson (1994) fitting procedure on 
Euro-zone benchmark bond data of countries rated AAA by Fitch.    
 
4. Results 
Table I presents the mean and standard deviation for daily bond and stock returns by 
country. Countries are listed in a way that easily enables us to form groups that share 
common return characteristics on a consistent basis, as we will show in the rest of the 
analysis. Finland, Germany and the Netherlands are at the top of the list and we label them 
                                                                                                                                                                            
because the firm bid and ask quotes posted on MTS are extremely wide making the mid-point prices very 
volatile.      
11
 Bloomberg reports CMA CDS prices starting 01 Oct 2004 for Austria, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Portugal and 
Greece. For the other 5 Euro-zone countries in our analysis, the starting date of the CDS data varies: 25 Jan 
2005 for Germany, 29 Sep 2005 for the Netherlands, 25 Apr 2005 for Finland, 17 Aug 2005 for France, and 09 
Jan 2008 for Ireland. Similar to Beber et al. (2009), a complete dataset of CDS prices are obtained using linear 
interpolation. Note that when we eliminate all interpolated data our results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
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as “low risk”. Austria, Belgium and France, are “medium risk” sovereigns. Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain are “high risk” countries.  
We have identified four main sub-periods in our sample. The first is the pre-crisis, before 
August 2007, which is characterised by economic expansion and low market volatilities in 
most of the countries in our sample. The level of interest rates in the Euro-zone increases in 
this period. As a result, average bond returns are negative for all the 11 countries under 
analysis. However, stock returns are generally positive over the same period. 
In August 2007, PNB Paribas closed down three of their hedge funds highly specialized in 
US mortgage debt. This is one of the early events that signal major problems in the 
subprime market. Sovereign bond return averages become positive, with the exception of 
Greece, and may be indicative of a “flight-to-safety” as stock returns turn negative across 
Europe. We choose January 2010 as the start of the sovereign crisis in Europe. This is the 
time when investors learn that Greece might struggle to repay its debt. We split this period 
into two parts, each sub-period with a length of two years (from January 2010 to December 
2011 and from January 2012 to December 2013), where we observe rather distinct bond 
and stock price movements.
12
  
As shown in Figure I, in the first part of the sovereign debt crisis the bond market in the 
high risk countries become positively correlated with their stock markets. Investors now 
may perceive government securities from high risk sovereigns to be similar to stocks, that is, 
as if they were risky assets. On the contrary, the correlation between stocks and bonds in 
low risk countries remains negative in the first part of the sovereign crisis. This is also 
reflected in Table I where low risk bonds have positive mean returns during this sub-period. 
By contrast, high risk bonds have negative mean returns similar to most stock markets. The 
only exceptions are the equity markets in Finland and Ireland which are mildly positive, 
though both exhibit much higher volatility relative to pre-crisis levels. 
In the second part of the sovereign debt crisis we observe reversals that may indicate 
the start of a recovery phase. Indeed, bond returns in low risk countries go back to pre-crisis 
(negative) levels. On the other hand, returns for all stock markets, and bond markets in high 
risk economies, become positive. Likely, higher confidence that a recovery is underway 
                                                        
12
 As a robustness test we change the cut-off point between the acute and recovery phases of the sovereign 
crisis from 1st January 2012 to 1st July 2012. This is roughly the time when credit default swap spreads start to 
fall (see Figure II). The results remain qualitatively the same.   
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encourages investors to move away from low yielding safe assets and towards more risky 
ones, which represents a “flight-to-yield”. Government bond returns for Greece in this sub-
period are not reported due to the scarcity of reliable data. In this phase of the crisis, most 
Greek bonds were traded a few hours per day or not at all.  
We further explore the relationship between bond returns on one end and stock returns 
as well as credit and liquidity variables on the other, with univariate regressions, before 
employing the full regression model in Equation (1). Figure III presents the results when the 
equity, credit and liquidity factors are employed separately as the only explanatory variable. 
The signs of the equity betas confirm the findings previously described in Figure I. As 
expected, there is virtually no indication that either credit or liquidity factors influence 
sovereign bond prices in the pre-crisis period.  
During the subprime crisis, CDS price changes in low risk countries are positively and 
statistically significantly related to bond returns. This suggests that higher credit risk in the 
local sovereign bond market does not deter investors from buying such securities. The likely 
implication is that as risk increases in all markets, those that are perceived to be less risky 
become winners, which is a classic flight-to-safety scenario. Indeed, for countries that later 
experienced solvency problems higher credit risk is associated with negative bond returns as 
investors shift to safer assets. The distinction between high and low risk countries becomes 
clear in the first part of the sovereign debt crisis when high risk countries exhibit a negative 
and statistically significant CDS coefficient which persists into the second part of the crisis.  
With respect to liquidity effects, the coefficients of bid-ask spread changes are 
statistically significant only for high risk countries and with a negative sign. This 
phenomenon is similar to the one documented by Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012) in the US 
corporate bond market during the subprime crisis. They find that AAA corporate bonds are 
not affected by liquidity risk whereas lower-grade corporates are. This result is viewed as 
indicative of a flight from low to high grade corporates in times of crisis. This explanation 
would fit with the negative sovereign bond return of high risk countries and positive return 
of low risk countries in the first phase of the sovereign crisis (see Table I). In contrast, during 
the subprime crisis, we find a negative and significant liquidity coefficient for most of the 
high risk countries even though bond returns are mostly positive. This suggests a 
repositioning of investors from the stock market (where returns are mostly negative) into 
both high and low risk government bonds. Moreover, the repositioning in high risk countries 
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would be, more specifically, towards liquid bonds. This is because the negative liquidity beta 
of high risk sovereigns indicates that only bonds with a contraction in bid-ask spreads would 
benefit from a positive return. 
Next, we combine equity, credit and liquidity factors in our multivariate regression 
analysis. Results are reported in Table II. The findings are broadly in line with our 
preliminary intuitions based on the univariate analysis. However, the stock market 
coefficient for high risk countries is statistically significant and negative during the first part 
of the sovereign debt crisis period, contrary to what observed in the univariate case. This 
counter-intuitive result can be explained by the high negative correlation between the 
credit risk factor and the stock market in a crisis, which causes the latter to flip sign. As done 
in previous studies (e.g. Fama and French, 1993; Petkova 2006) we control for the 
interference generated by highly correlated variables through orthogonalization. 
Specifically, we replace the credit risk factor with its innovations, that is, the residuals 
obtained by regressing the factor against all the other explanatory variables in Equation (1).  
The results of the new model are reported in Table III and are now fully consistent with our 
prior expectations. We confirm a strong flight-to-safety episode during the first part of the 
sovereign bond crisis when Euro zone investors move funds away from both stocks and 
bonds of high risk countries towards government bonds of low risk countries. 
 
4.1. Time-varying equity beta 
Table III clearly highlights that the equity beta of government bond returns is time 
varying. However, our results so far are silent about the factors behind such time variation. 
Therefore, we test a time series regression model over the whole sample period where the 
equity beta is allowed to vary over time. Its time variation is generated by the interaction 
between the equity factor and a selection of explanatory variables. These include 
macroeconomic fundamentals and financial variables we draw from the literature (details 
are shown in Appendix A) or, as an alternative, a country risk threshold indicator. We have 
computed daily changes of monthly/quarterly macro-variables by equally distributing the 
change in the relevant variable across all the trading days in the month/quarter. The model 
is estimated separately for each country and is specified as follows, 
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#$( − #-.$( = * + 456-/0( − #-.$(7 +89:
:
;:,(6-/0( − #-.$(7 + <( 	
            (2) 
where #$( is the average daily return across all benchmark bonds available for a specific 
country at time t and  ;:,(  are the interacted factors. As a country risk indicator we use a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the 5 year sovereign CDS of a country exceeds 
a pre-defined threshold, and zero otherwise. As a result, the time varying equity beta can be 
expressed as, 
β, = 45 +89:
:
;:,( 
(3) 
Figure IV shows, at the top, the pattern of the realised CAPM beta of the sovereign 
bonds of high risk versus low risk countries estimated with rolling 1 year time windows. As 
one should expect, these reflect the patterns of stock-bond correlations observed in Figure 
I, with a clear sign switch from negative to positive for high risk countries. In Figure IV we 
also present the plot of the time varying equity beta obtained by interacting the equity 
factor with our country risk dummy alone. The dummy enables our simple specification to 
capture the equity beta sign switch at the time it occurs, i.e. around the beginning of the 
sovereign crisis. The optimal credit spread threshold used to define the dummy is 2% which 
achieves the maximum explanatory power of our regression model across high risk 
countries.13 The identification of a threshold for country risk that can determine a sign 
switch in the equity beta has profound implications. First, it could be used as an important 
tripwire for fiscal policy makers. Exceeding the threshold will entail higher debt servicing 
costs and it will indicate a time when government bonds may no longer be treated by 
investors as a hedge against stock market risk. This alone may cause bond yields to go even 
higher producing a vicious circle with potentially serious repercussions for the sustainability 
of public debt and important consequences for public spending and taxation. Second, 
monetary policy could also be influenced by the threshold. The ECB intervened vigorously 
with unconventional measures to prevent or counter excessive government bond yields 
                                                        
13
 We have tried different thresholds 25 basis points apart from 1% to 3% and found 2% to be the best one. 
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during the sovereign crisis. Our threshold could be used, alongside other indicators, to 
inform and guide central banks’ decisions on when bond buying programmes are needed to 
pre-empt large sell offs of government debt from investors. Third, the country risk threshold 
could also be embedded in systemic risk and stress testing models, now widely used by 
macro prudential regulators, as a crisis indicator.  
Next, we test whether macro-variables as well as changes in sovereign CDS spreads and 
bond bid-ask spreads can explain the sign change in equity beta. As show in Figure IV we 
find that, like the country risk dummy, they do capture the change in sign. However, with 
the country risk dummy the sign switch of the conditional equity beta occurs at the same 
time as for the realised beta, i.e. at the beginning of the sovereign crisis. But, when using 
macro and other financial factors the sign switch is anticipated to the middle of the sub-
prime crisis, more than a year earlier, which is not consistent with observed data. The 
conditional equity betas in Figure IV are estimated with alternative specifications of 
Equation (2) where the excess return of the equity factor is interacted with the country risk 
dummy alone (second graph of Figure IV) or with all the macro factors with the exclusion of 
the country risk dummy (third graph). The regression results of these alternative models are 
reported in Table IV (Model II and IV respectively) together with other specifications. By 
adding sequentially macro factors (results unreported) we found that the determining 
macro variable to explain the sign switch in equity beta, though with imperfect timing, 
appears to be the 5 year correlation between economic growth (proxied with industrial 
production) and inflation. However, we observed that growth-inflation correlation alone 
could not achieve this outcome but only through a complex interaction with other macro 
factors. Also, while in the literature (Burkhardt and Hasseltoft, 2012; Campbell et al., 2016; 
Song, 2016) such correlation is negatively related to the equity beta, we find that its sign 
and significance vary widely across countries (Models III to V). Indeed, if we look at its sign 
when used with all other macro and financial variables (Model IV) it is positive and highly 
statistically significant for Netherlands, Austria, Belgium and Spain, negative and highly 
significant for Germany, Finland, Italy, Portugal and Greece and not significant for France 
and Ireland. So, the observation in the literature that stock bond covariance (or equity beta) 
is positive when inflation and economic growth are inversely related (e.g. in stagflation 
periods) and negative when inflation and growth are positively related (e.g. during the 
subprime and sovereign crisis when both were low) does not appear to have general 
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validity. Indeed, when inspecting such relationship graphically we could not find obvious 
patterns. When adding to the macro factors the country risk dummy (Model V) the growth-
inflation correlation turns consistently negative but only for high risk countries. 
 
 
4.2. Implications for portfolio allocation 
Our regression results reveal a clear decoupling between high and low risk bond returns 
starting from the beginning of the sovereign crisis. The contrasting sign of the returns 
between the two types of sovereign debt and their different relationship with key risk 
factors suggest a radical shift in investors’ behaviour. Here, we explore how such 
phenomenon may affect investors with different risk appetite and asset allocation 
strategies. Specifically, we look at how the crises have altered diversification opportunities 
across stocks and bonds. To address these points we first group stocks and bonds according 
to the risk profile of the country of issue. We call “low risk” assets those issued in low risk 
countries, namely Germany, Finland and Netherlands, while “high risk” assets are issued in 
Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland or Greece. Table V presents the descriptive statistics and 
correlations between the asset classes in each time period. As one would expect, 
correlations between the high risk and low risk stocks is high throughout the sample period 
with its peak during the subprime crisis at 91%.  
More importantly, while correlation between the high and low risk bond portfolios is 
high in the pre-crisis and subprime periods (99.5% and 87.9% respectively), it drops 
dramatically and even turns negative during the two phases of the sovereign crisis (-19.6% 
and -17.6% respectively). This is strong evidence of the deep decoupling in the European 
sovereign bond market between high and low risk countries. The two types of government 
securities are clearly perceived and traded as if they were different asset classes: one as a 
safe asset to invest into in a crisis, the other, more like stocks, as a higher yield asset to 
invest into in recovery periods. Indeed, the correlations between high risk bonds and stocks 
become substantially positive during the sovereign crisis, while it was markedly negative in 
previous periods. 
Clearly, this sharp change in correlation has major implications for fund managers and 
how they can diversify risk. To explore this point we build five equally weighted asset 
portfolios that differ by asset composition (diversified as opposed to concentrated) and risk 
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profile (low or high risk). The portfolios are (1) a pure bond fund with equally weighted bond 
indices of low and high risk countries, (2) a pure equity fund with equally weighted equity 
indices of low and high risk countries, (3) a diversified fund that includes all the above, (4) a 
pension fund, with low risk stocks and bonds and (5) a hedge fund with positions in high risk 
stocks and bonds. Next, we look at the risk adjusted returns of each portfolio, before and 
during the crisis periods, with modified Sharpe ratios. It is well known that the Sharpe ratio 
is uninformative when returns are negative, since higher volatility will increase the ratio (i.e. 
it would make it less negative) thus reversing its usual interpretation. The solution proposed 
by Israelsen (2005) addresses this problem.14 Our main findings, reported in Table VI, are as 
follows.  
First, unsurprisingly, if an investor had perfect foresight they would prefer “pure” 
portfolio strategies, i.e. portfolios that are made of a specific asset class (stocks or bonds) 
and risk profile (high or low) rather than more diversified portfolios. It is interesting that 
during the subprime and sovereign crisis periods bond portfolios exhibit the largest Sharpe 
ratios. Portfolios of sovereign bonds from low risk countries outperform all other pure and 
diversified strategies in the subprime crisis and the first part of the sovereign crisis with a  
modified Sharpe ratio of 0.06 and 0.67 respectively. This is likely the result of a flight-to-
safety from other asset classes (including high risk sovereign bonds). In the second part of 
the sovereign crisis, which is characterised by a marked recovery, sovereign bonds from high 
risk countries make the largest risk adjusted gains (1.72) and dominate all other strategies. 
This is confirmed by panel D in Table V where we see a mean return of high risk bonds at 
13.2% which, although lower than that of stocks, is also much less volatile.  
As we extend the holding period we observe that often pure strategies still dominate. 
Low risk bonds exhibit the highest Sharpe ratio (0.17) over the whole crisis period including 
the subprime and sovereign crises. However, low risk stocks appear to be the preferred 
option when we extend the holding period to the pre-crisis (0.27). Both strategies are 
characterised by relatively low diversification (i.e. investment restricted to a specific asset 
class) and low risk. The upshot is that indiscriminate diversification across asset classes is 
                                                        
14
 Israelsen (2005) reformulates the Sharpe measure as the product (rather than the ratio) of excess returns 
and volatility when excess returns are negative. This implies that the modified Sharpe measure can provide a 
meaningful ranking of portfolio performances. However, the difference between the modified Sharpe 
measures of two portfolios that exhibit excess return of opposite sign cannot be used to quantify the extent to 
which one portfolio is better than the other in risk adjusted terms.  
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never a winning strategy in the observation period. Instead, “prudent diversification”, i.e. 
restricted to low risk assets, yields the best outcomes in risk adjusted terms for buy-and-
hold investors. Diversifying across asset classes with low risk, the typical approach of a 
pension fund for example, also exhibits consistently good results over longer horizons. This 
is because low risk government bonds have persistently negative equity beta, which implies 
that they produce substantial diversification gains when combined with stocks.  
 
5. Robustness  
5.1. Quantitative Easing 
During the subprime and sovereign crises, the European Central Bank took extensive 
unconventional monetary policy measures aimed at easing financial conditions. To explore 
the impact of such measures on sovereign bond returns and stock-bond covariances we 
have built dummy variables to capture the above effects in line with previous literature 
(Alter and Beyer, 2014; Beirne et al., 2011; Fawley and Neely, 2013; Fratzscher et al., 2014; 
Krishnamurthy et al., 2014; Szczerbowicz, 2015). We include 4 dummies in our Equation (1) 
which control for the following ECB actions: (1) ECB announcements of unconventional 
policy measures obtained from ECB press releases; (2) allotment days of long-term 
refinancing operations (LTRO) with maturity of 6 months or higher sourced from the ECB 
history of all open market operations;
15
 (3) days when securities market programs (SMP) are 
active obtained from weekly ECB financial statements; and (4) days when covered bond 
purchase programmes (CBPP) are active sourced from the ECB statistical data warehouse. 
We also account for changes in broad money supply via conventional ECB policies by 
including in the regression the Euro Area monetary aggregate M3 (available from the ECB 
statistical data warehouse). The monthly change in M3 is distributed equally across all 
trading days in the month. As can be seen in Table VII, our results are robust to the inclusion 
of ECB unconventional and conventional policy dummies. The incremental change in R-
squared is very small and neither the significance nor the sign of the main coefficients 
                                                        
15
 In response to the deteriorating liquidity conditions experienced by Eurozone banks because of the crisis, 
the ECB decided to (i) extend the maturity of the LTRO above the conventional 3 months and to (ii) offer 
unlimited capital for the same interest rate (fixed-rate full allotment procedure). Thus, the LTRO allotment 
date marks an exceptional demand of capital. 
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change. We also try several alternative model specifications: (a) We include distinct ECB 
unconventional policy dummies for each announcement and intervention date; (b) We 
replace the SMP and CBPP dummy variables with the log of actual ECB purchases under the 
two programs; and (c) We consider changes in Euro area total assets instead of the Euro 
area monetary aggregate M3. All these tests do not change qualitatively any of our 
findings.
16
 
 
5.2. Flights-to-Safety 
Abnormally large negative correlations may influence, and possibly drive, the sign of our 
equity betas. We have extended our analysis to control for events when stocks and bonds 
exhibit significantly large returns in the opposite direction. Following Baele et al. (2015) and 
Ermolov (2015) we introduce a flight-to-safety dummy that captures instances when bond 
returns are abnormally positive and stock returns are abnormally negative within a specific 
country. “Abnormal” returns are those that deviate from their mean by more than 2 
standard deviations. Results are reported in Table VIII. Even when controlling for flights-to-
safety all our main conclusions remain unaltered. Interestingly, the equity beta of Greece 
becomes positive and highly statistically significant during the sub-prime crisis. This suggests 
that by controlling for extreme events when bonds attract flying stock investors, Greek 
sovereign bonds begin to acquire “equity-like” features even before the sovereign debt 
crisis. 
 
5.3. International Risk Factor and LOIS Spread 
Codogno et al. (2003) and Favero et al. (2010) employ an international risk factor in their 
analysis of European sovereign bond returns. Constructed as the spread between the 10 
year US interest swap rate and the 10 year Treasury bond rate, this factor is typically viewed 
as a global measure of investors’ risk aversion. Aït-Sahalia et al. (2012) and Schwarz (2016) 
use the LOIS spread given by the difference between the 3 month EURIBOR and EONIA 
rates, which should capture credit and liquidity shocks in the interbank money market. We 
add changes of these two variables to our model in Equation (1) and present the results in 
Table IX. The international risk factor is highly statistically significant and negative in the pre-
                                                        
16
 These results are available on request. 
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crisis and subprime crisis periods for all countries included in our analysis. However, the 
effect of this factor disappears altogether in the sovereign debt crisis period. This is 
suggestive of investors shifting their attention away from the US markets and focusing more 
on European risk factors. The LOIS spread is highly statistically significant and positive for all 
countries during all time periods except for high risk countries where it dies out with the 
start of the sovereign debt crisis. Overall, the combined effect of both factors is substantial 
during the pre-crisis period (i.e. a 6% increase in the R-squared on average), but becomes 
negligible as the financial crisis intensifies. Our results are robust to the introduction of 
these additional factors. 
 
5.4. The TERM Factor 
Fama and French (1993) include a TERM factor as a determinant of government bond 
returns to capture maturity effects. This is commonly defined as the difference between a 
long-term government bond return and a short-term government bond rate. We build the 
TERM factor as the return difference between a 10 year bond portfolio specific to each 
country and the 3 month ECB rate.
17,18
 This factor appears to be an appropriate explanatory 
variable for stocks and corporate bonds. However, we note that our TERM factor is 
completely dominated by the long-term bond component as the variability and magnitude 
of the 3 month ECB rate are both relatively much smaller. Table X presents the country 
specific correlation between the TERM factor and excess bond returns for short, medium 
and long-term maturity bands. Most countries exhibit very high correlation values especially 
for medium and long-term bonds. To illustrate the negligible impact of the short-term 
government rate in TERM we also report the correlation between the excess bond return 
and TERM defined simply as the 10 year bond return (that is, without subtracting the short-
term return). Correlations remain virtually unchanged. When using TERM in our regressions 
(unreported results) several variables exhibit counter-intuitive signs and/or statistical 
significance.  
Therefore, instead of employing TERM, we control for maturity effects in two alternative 
ways. First, we interact the equity factor with maturity dummies. As shown in Table XI our 
                                                        
17
 To build the time series of the 10 year bond portfolio we average, each day, all country specific bond returns 
with a remaining time-to-maturity between 9 and 11 years.    
18
 We also consider the 3 month EURIBOR rate instead of the 3 month ECB rate. Results remain unchanged. 
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results are confirmed and the equity like behaviour of high risk bonds during the sovereign 
crisis appears to be pervasive across maturities. Second, following Chen et al. (2007) we also 
run our main regression on bond returns standardised by duration (unreported). Our 
findings remain virtually the same. None of the coefficients changes in sign or significance 
and R-squared’s only increase slightly as compared to the ones in the original Table III. We 
interpret this result as further evidence that our results are robust to maturity effects. 
 
5.5. Liquidity Proxies 
Besides the bid-ask spread we have looked at other proxies to capture liquidity effects in 
the sovereign bond market. The illiquidity proxy suggested by Schwarz (2016) is a Euro-zone 
market-wide (i.e. systematic) illiquidity measure defined as the yield difference between 
KfW bonds (fully backed by the German government) and Bunds. We have downloaded 
from Bloomberg the daily yield series for 79 KfW bonds from 2003 to 2010. This is the total 
number of KfW bonds that have more than 2 million EUR outstanding over the period. For 
consistency, we also rely on Bloomberg to obtain yield information for the German 
sovereign bonds in our sample. We then follow Schwarz (2016)’s methodology and build the 
liquidity measure for 3 maturity bands: 1.5 – 2.5 years, 4.5 – 5.5 years, and 9.5 – 10.5 years. 
The 10 year KFW illiquidity measure presents several discontinuities over the time 
period because of a lack of KfW bonds with a remaining time to maturity of 9.5 – 10.5 years. 
Therefore, we rely on daily changes in the 5 year series. Regression results with the Schwarz 
measure are shown in Table XII. Our main findings remain qualitatively unchanged except 
for occasional higher or lower significance for the CDS and bid-ask spread variables (for low 
and medium risk countries). Surprisingly, during the sub-prime crisis the coefficient of this 
illiquidity proxy is positive and statistically significant for all countries which appears to 
suggest that it may capture illiquidity trends outside the government bond market. The 
implication is that the severe liquidity shortages observed during the sub-prime crisis across 
a number of asset classes have benefited government bonds regardless of country risk, the 
likely result of a flight-to-safety. The same effect remains during the sovereign debt crisis 
but only for low and medium risk countries, as one would expect (though for medium risk 
countries the effect is only significant in the first part of the sovereign crisis). On the other 
hand, high risk countries exhibit a negative and highly statistically significant coefficient 
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which again conforms to our expectation of investors moving away from government 
securities when issuing countries experience distress.  
We have also considered depth as an alternative bond-specific liquidity proxy. For each 
intra-day quote update, depth is defined as the average tradable size available at the best 
bid and the best ask. Daily observations are computed as an average of all intra-day depth 
observations weighted by the time each quote update was available in the order book. This 
variable proved not to be statistically significant in most regressions. 
 
5.6. Predicting Country Risk 
The distinction we make between high, medium and low risk countries is based on ex 
post observation. Peripheral countries were clearly more affected by the sovereign crisis 
than other Euro members. One may wonder whether an investor could draw different 
lessons from our portfolio performance analysis if they could predict which countries would 
suffer the most in a crisis. With this in mind we looked at government bond yields to see if 
they could enable one to predict the decoupling observed during the sovereign crisis. Figure 
V shows the 1 year moving averages of the dummies that capture above median sovereign 
yields for each country at each point in time. It appears that when Lehman’s default 
occurred (denoted by the black vertical line) all low risk countries (Germany, Netherlands 
and Finland) had sovereign bond yields below the median of the 11 sample countries, and 
the high risk countries (Italy, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece) had yields above the 
median. This is interesting and relevant because, at that point in time, an investor who is 
looking for an exit will need to decide which safe assets to invest into. With inference made 
at that point in time we can see that the split that appears between high risk and low risk 
countries is almost identical to that in our original analysis. The only difference is that 
Belgium would be categorised as a high (rather than medium) risk country. We have re-
estimated our main panel regression with the new groupings.  Our (unreported) results 
remain qualitatively unchanged. Also our conclusions on risk adjusted performance do not 
change.
19
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 Results are available from the authors on request. 
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5.7. Other Robustness Tests 
We perform several other robustness tests. First, we change the cut-off date used to 
split the sovereign debt crisis in two intervals from 01 January 2012 to 01 July 2012 as there 
is a clear reduction in both CDS prices and bond bid-ask spreads after this date. Besides 
some loss in coefficient significance for the medium risk countries, the remaining results are 
virtually the same. Second, in the main analysis we use clean price returns. We test whether 
accrued interest has an impact on our results by estimating the dirty price for each bond. 
We use the following formula to compute bond returns:         
 
#$%,( =
=%,( + >?%,( + .%,(
=%,(@A + >?%,(@A 	− 	1 
(4) 
 
where  #$%,(  represents the bond return of bond ) on day ,, =%,( is the clean price, >?%,( is the 
accrued interest at time t and .%,( represents any coupon received in the period , − 1 to ,. 
Using dirty price return does not change our conclusions. Finally, to examine the sensitivity 
of our findings to our credit risk proxy, we replace our CDS data sourced from CMA with 5 
year CDS prices, denominated in US dollars, for our 11 Euro-zone countries with 
Bloomberg’s generic pricing source CBGN. We obtain very similar results with our original 
ones. Furthermore, we also consider 10 year CDS prices sourced from CMA and repeat our 
analysis. Again our findings remain unchanged. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The crises of the last decade offer a unique opportunity to study how the return of 
government bonds and stocks co-move when the market is subject to stress conditions of 
different degree and type. Using a comprehensive dataset of European sovereign bond 
prices stretching over a period of 10 years we find that government bonds of high risk 
countries lost their “safe-asset” status during the recent sovereign debt crisis. They have 
exhibited more equity-like behaviour since then, with positive and strongly significant co-
movements relative to the stock market as well as abnormally high levels of volatility. We 
observe that the sign switch in stock-bond covariance from negative to positive is primarily 
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associated with high levels of sovereign default risk. We identify a credit spread of 2% as the 
critical default risk threshold that is best related to flipping stock-bond covariances. Changes 
in macro-economic fundamentals are less successful in explaining such changes in co-
variation. Further, we observe that the crisis-induced decoupling in the government bond 
market between high risk and low risk countries appears to generate superior risk adjusted 
returns for investors that engage in “prudent diversification” by focusing on low risk bonds 
and/or low risk stocks. We also find that indiscriminate diversification yields sub-optimal 
performance, in risk adjusted terms, both in crisis periods and through-the-cycle. 
Both credit and liquidity risks are important factors in explaining the variation of 
sovereign bond returns. But they behave differently depending on the perceived 
creditworthiness of the country. If the country has a low probability of default, then credit 
impacts positively bond returns. For high risk countries the impact is negative. Both these 
results suggest a flight-to-safety. The other main risk factor, liquidity risk, seems to affect 
only distressed countries. 
One of the aspects that we have not explored in this study is the impact on sovereign 
bond returns of an implicit public guarantee that Euro membership may offer. Useful 
insights on this point may be drawn from the studies that look at the pricing implications on 
agency bonds of the implicit support enjoyed by Government Sponsored Enterprises in the 
US (e.g. Frame and White, 2005 and 2007; Passmore, 2005; Hancock and Passmore, 2010). 
Our analysis clearly shows that any implicit guarantee from Euro membership, even if 
present, was not sufficient to prevent the stark decoupling in the sovereign bond market 
between high risk and low risk countries that we have documented. Although this could 
have distorted the pricing of sovereign debt and contained credit and liquidity effects, it is 
likely that our main conclusions would have been stronger if such distortion had been 
accounted for. How much stronger they would have been, and the likely systemic risk 
repercussions if such guarantee became less credible, are interesting topics for future 
research.
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Figure I. Rolling 1 year correlation between sovereign bond portfolios and the stock market  
This figure presents the rolling 1 year correlation between sovereign bond portfolios and stock market portfolio for 
different groups of Euro-zone countries depending on risk.  Group bond/stock portfolio returns are obtained as an average 
of bond/stock portfolio returns belonging to the countries inside the group. Country-specific bond portfolio returns are 
estimated as return averages of all sovereign benchmark bonds of a country. Country-specific stock market returns are 
obtained from equity indices data for each Euro-zone country. Countries included are Germany (DE), the Netherlands (NL), 
Finland (FI), Italy (IT), Spain (ES), Portugal (PT), Ireland (IE), and Greece (GR). We employ daily observations. Sub-periods 
are 01 Oct 2004 to 31 Jul 2007 for the pre-crisis (PRE), 01 Aug 2007 and 31 Dec 2009 for the subprime crisis (SUB), 01 Jan 
2010 to 30 Dec 2011 and 01 Jan 2012 to 31 Dec 2013 for the first (SOV I) and second (SOV II) part, respectively, of 
sovereign debt crisis. 
 
 
 
 
-80%
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
Rolling 1 year correlation between sovereign 
bond portfolios and  the stock market 
Low Risk Countries (DE, NL, FI) High Risk Countries (IT, ES, PT, IE, GR)
PRE SUB SOV I SOV II 
  
 
31 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to Dec 2013. All values are expressed in basis points. The vertical lines represent major global events. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure II. Individual country 5 year CDS spreads and average proportional bid-ask spreads. This 
figure shows the daily 5 year CDS spreads and proportional bid-ask spreads for each Eurozone country from 
Oct 2004 
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Figure III. Univariate regressions of Excess Sovereign Bond Returns on Excess Stock Market 
Returns, Changes in 5 year CDS Spreads, and Changes in Bid-Ask Spreads 
This figure reports the statistically significant coefficients (at 10%) of the following panel regression model:  
#$%,&',( − #-.$( = * +C;( + <%,&',( 
where #$%,&',( represents the mid-price return at time , of bond ) issued by country *+, #-.$( represents the 3 month ECB 
yield, and	;(is equal to either the excess equity index return (-/0&',( −#-.$(; top figure), the change of the country 
specific 5 year CDS spread (∆.12&',( ; middle figure), or the change of the bond specific proportional bid-ask spread 
(∆23+%,&',(; bottom figure). Corresponding adjusted-R2s are presented in the figures on the right. Countries included are 
Germany (DE), the Netherlands (NL), Finland (FI), Italy (IT), Spain (ES), Portugal (PT), Ireland (IE), and Greece (GR). We 
employ daily observations. For each sub-period, regressions variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% taking into account all 
time-series observations demeaned at the bond level. Sub-periods are 01 Oct 2004 to 31 Jul 2007 for the pre-crisis, 01 Aug 
2007 and 31 Dec 2009 for the subprime crisis; the sovereign crisis is split into two parts, 01 Jan 2010 to 30 Dec 2011 and 
between 01 Jan 2012 to 31 Dec 2013. White (1980) cross-section standard errors and covariance are used. 
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Figure IV. Conditional Equity Beta and Realised CAPM Beta 
This figure reports the rolling 1 year cross-country averages of realised CAPM betas (top figure), of betas estimated with an 
interacted 200 bp CDS dummy (middle figure), and of betas estimated with interacted macro-factors (bottom figure). 
Group bond/stock portfolio returns are obtained as an average of bond/stock portfolio returns belonging to the countries 
inside the group. Country-specific bond portfolio returns are estimated as return averages of all sovereign benchmark 
bonds of a country. Countries included are Germany (DE), the Netherlands (NL), Finland (FI), Italy (IT), Spain (ES), Portugal 
(PT), Ireland (IE), and Greece (GR).  The base rate is the 3 month AAA ECB yield. We employ daily observations. Sub-periods 
are 01 Oct 2004 to 31 Jul 2007 for the pre-crisis (PRE), 01 Aug 2007 and 31 Dec 2009 for the subprime crisis (SUB), 01 Jan 
2010 to 30 Dec 2011 and 01 Jan 2012 to 31 Dec 2013 for the first (SOV I) and second (SOV II) part, respectively, of the 
sovereign debt crisis. 
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Figure V. Rolling 1 year average of days when the country-specific 10 year bond yield is above the 
median  
These figures present the rolling 1 year average of days when the country-specific 10 year bond yield is above the Euro-
zone median yield. The 10 year sovereign bond series are built using yield data from Bloomberg by considering each day 
the yield of the bond with the residual maturity closes to 10 years. The Lehman collapse on 15 Sep 2008 is signalled by the 
black vertical line. Euro-zone countries included are Germany (DE), the Netherlands (NL), Finland (FI), France (FR), Austria 
(AT), Belgium (BE), Italy (IT), Spain (ES), Portugal (PT), Ireland (IE), and Greece (GR). 
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Appendix A. Macro and financial variables employed to obtain time varying equity betas. 
 
Series Source Unit 
 
Quarterly 
Output Gap Estimated 
(Real GDP / Real GDP Quadratic 
Trend) - 1  
Real GDP Eurostat Chained 2010 Prices SWDA 
Debt/GDP Eurostat Ratio 
   
Monthly 
Retail Sales Eurostat Volume SA 
Unemployment Rate Eurostat Harmonized Rate SA 
CPI Eurostat Harmonized index, 2005=100 NSA 
Imports Eurostat Volume index, 2010=100 SWDA 
Exports Eurostat Volume index, 2010=100 SWDA 
Industry Production Eurostat Volume index, 2010=100 SWDA 
Money supply M3 Datastream Volume Billion Euro 
Economic Sentiment European Commission Index SA 
Rolling 5 year Correlation 
between Industrial Production 
Growth and Inflation 
Eurostat Percentage points 
   
Daily 
5 year CDS spread Bloomberg Basis Points 
Proportional Bid-Ask Spread MTS Time Series Basis Points 
Note: SA, NSA and SWDA refer to Seasonally Adjusted, Not Seasonally Adjusted and Seasonally and 
Working Day Adjusted series, respectively. 
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Appendix B. ECB Unconventional Policy Measures 
The following two tables present the dates for the Announcement and LTRO dummies  
 
Announcement dummy dates 
Date Description 
28/03/2008 2 supplementary 6 month LTROs. 
04/09/2008 Supplementary 6 month LTRO. 
07/10/2008 Increase in allotment amount of 6 month LTRO. 
09/10/2008 Fixed-rate full allotment (FRFA) procedure in the main refinancing operations (MROs). 
13/10/2008 Liquidity in U.S. dollars (currency swaps with the Fed) provided at FRFA procedure. 
15/10/2008 
5 supplementary 6 month LTROs. FRFA procedure in all longer-term refinancing 
operations (LTROs). 
05/03/2009 
ECB will continue with the current frequency and maturity profile of supplementary 
LTROs for as long as needed until the end of 2009. 
07/05/2009 
ECB announced it would purchase euro-denominated covered bonds issued in the 
euro area (CBPP1). 3 supplementary 1 year LTROs. 
03/12/2009 Supplementary 6-month LTRO. 
10/05/2010 
Supplementary 6-month LTRO. Reactivation of FRFA procedure in regular longer-term 
refinancing operations (LTROs). 
10/05/2010 ECB introduces Securities Markets Programme (SMP1). 
04/08/2011 Supplementary 6-month LTRO. 
08/08/2011 SMP second phase announced (SMP2). 
06/10/2011 
ECB announced the second covered bond purchase programme (CBPP2). 
Supplementary 12 month and 13 month LTRO. 
08/12/2011 ECB to conduct two 3 year LTRO with provisions of repayment after one year. 
26/07/2012 ECB President Mario Draghi speech ("whatever it takes to preserve the euro"). 
06/09/2012 ECB announced Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT).  
 
 
LTRO dummy dates 
Allotment Dates Maturity  Allotment Dates Maturity 
02/04/2008 6 Months  12/08/2009 6 Months 
09/07/2008 6 Months  09/09/2009 6 Months 
08/10/2008 6 Months  30/09/2009 1 Year 
12/11/2008 6 Months  07/10/2009 6 Months 
10/12/2008 6 Months  11/11/2009 6 Months 
07/01/2009 6 Months  09/12/2009 6 Months 
11/02/2009 6 Months  16/12/2009 1 Year 
11/03/2009 6 Months  31/03/2010 6 Months 
08/04/2009 6 Months  12/05/2010 6 Months 
13/05/2009 6 Months  10/08/2011 6 Months 
10/06/2009 6 Months  26/10/2011 1 Year 
24/06/2009 1 Year  21/12/2011 3 Years 
08/07/2009 6 Months  29/02/2012 3 Years 
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Table I 
Summary Statistics for Sovereign Bond Returns and Equity Returns 
The table shows the annualized averages and standard deviations of daily sovereign bond and equity returns for each country in our sample in 
percentage points. The pre-crisis covers the time period from 01 Oct 2004 until 31 Jul 2007. The subprime crisis period denotes the time period 
between 01 Aug 2007 and 31 Dec 2009. The first part of the sovereign debt crisis goes from 01 Jan 2010 to 30 Dec 2011 and the second part between 
01 Jan 2012 to 31 Dec 2013. The following representative stock market indices are used for each country in our sample: DAX (30 stocks, Germany), AEX 
(25 stocks, Netherlands), OMX Helsinki (25 stocks, Finland), CAC (40 stocks, France), ATX (20 stocks, Austria),  BEL (20 stocks, Belgium), MIB (40 stocks, Italy), 
IBEX (35 stocks, Spain), PSI (20 stocks, Portugal), ISEQ (20 stocks, Ireland), ATHEX (20 stocks, Greece). We employ simple returns following Fama and French 
(1993). 
Panel A: Sovereign Bond Returns (%) 
  Pre-crisis period  Subprime crisis period  Sovereign crisis period I  Sovereign crisis period II 
  Mean St.Dev.  Mean St.Dev.  Mean St.Dev.  Mean St.Dev. 
Germany  -0.7 3.4  2.6 6.1  3.8 6.3  -1.5 5.4 
Netherlands  -0.9 4.0  3.0 6.2  4.0 6.7  -1.1 5.5 
Finland  -1.1 2.8  2.6 4.2  1.4 4.4  -1.7 4.9 
France  -0.8 4.0  3.2 6.2  1.4 7.1  0.2 5.5 
Austria  -1.4 3.8  2.3 6.6  2.6 6.6  0.1 6.6 
Belgium  -0.9 4.2  2.9 5.9  -0.3 7.5  3.5 5.3 
Italy  -1.0 3.5  2.5 5.1  -6.0 9.4  7.1 8.1 
Spain  -0.9 3.9  2.0 6.4  -2.0 10.3  4.0 10.3 
Portugal  -1.4 3.4  2.4 6.1  -21.4 17.3  22.2 17.6 
Ireland  -0.3 3.8  1.3 6.4  -5.3 18.0  18.1 41.3 
Greece  -1.3 3.5   -1.0 7.2   -26.1 30.4   NA NA 
Panel B: Equity Index Returns (%) 
  Pre-crisis period  Subprime crisis period  Sovereign crisis period I  Sovereign crisis period II 
  Mean St.Dev.  Mean St.Dev.  Mean St.Dev.  Mean St.Dev. 
Germany  24.0 16.8  -8.0 30.5  -0.7 23.8  21.1 16.6 
Netherlands  18.1 15.4  -12.9 33.1  -1.1 21.2  13.1 14.2 
Finland  24.4 14.4  -12.5 32.6  1.2 26.0  20.0 19.5 
France  18.4 14.5  -10.0 31.8  -7.2 25.9  16.4 18.2 
Austria  32.0 15.5  -17.3 38.9  -9.9 26.2  16.0 18.7 
Belgium  22.6 12.4  -17.8 29.2  -6.5 22.2  17.4 15.4 
Italy  14.5 12.2  -16.6 31.8  -16.4 29.3  13.9 24.4 
Spain  21.3 13.1  -3.8 30.7  -11.9 28.7  9.8 23.5 
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Portugal  21.0 9.5  -15.1 25.0  -18.1 23.0  10.2 18.4 
Ireland  17.3 14.1  -33.2 40.7  2.7 22.6  22.8 14.6 
Greece  30.6 17.3  -26.4 37.5  -60.6 42.1  26.5 41.5 
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Table II 
Determinants of Excess Sovereign Bond Returns by Country Group 
This table reports panel regression coefficients for the following model: 
#$%,&',( − #-.$( = * + CDEF-/0&',( −#-.$( + CGHI∆.12&',( +	CIJK∆23+%,&',( + <%,&',( 		 
where RB,, denotes the mid-price return for bond i issued by country cr on day t, RECB represents the 3 month ECB yield, EQT, is the country specific stock index return,	∆CDS, is the 
change in country specific 5 year CDS spreads,	∆Spr,, is the change in bond specific proportional bid-ask spread. We employ daily observations. For each sub-period, regressions variables are 
winsorized at 1% and 99% taking into account all time-series observations demeaned at the bond level. Sub-periods are from 01 Oct 2004 to 31 Jul 2007 for the pre-crisis, from 01 Aug 2007 to 
31 Dec 2009 for the subprime crisis; the sovereign crisis is split into two parts, from 01 Jan 2010 to 30 Dec 2011 and between 01 Jan 2012 and 31 Dec 2013. White (1980) cross-section standard 
errors and covariances are used. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
  Panel A: Low Risk Countries (Germany, Netherlands and Finland)   Panel B: Medium Risk Countries (France, Austria and Belgium) 
Coefficient  
Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
  Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
CDEF   -0.024 ***  -0.059 ***  -0.087 ***  -0.057 ***    -0.033 ***  -0.060 ***  -0.097 ***  -0.017 * 
CGHI  -0.283  0.893  1.483 ***  1.511 ***    -2.389 *  -0.381  -1.913 ***  -1.649 *** 
CIJK  -0.616  -0.235  -0.265  -0.079    -0.685  -0.130  -0.170 *  0.022 
                  
Adj-R
2
  1.29%  12.13%  19.09%  6.14%    1.91%  10.29%  9.78%  3.57% 
Per/Cross-sec  643/73  609/84  513/98  507/111    722/68  609/75  513/86  507/108 
#Obs  30,455   35,932   36,737   43,689     33,323   37,427   36,464   42,724 
  Panel C: High Risk Countries (Italy, Ireland, Spain and Portugal)   Panel D: Greece 
Coefficient  
Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
  Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
CDEF   -0.024 ***  -0.045 ***  -0.019 *  0.052 ***    -0.018 ***  -0.018 ***  0.046 **   NA 
CGHI  -0.454  -0.875 ***  -2.161 ***  -2.517 ***    0.669  -1.970 ***  -2.419 ***   NA 
CIJK  -1.422  -0.375 ***  -0.089 ***  0.003    -0.643  -0.082 **  -0.038   NA 
                  
Adj-R
2
  0.82%  6.15%  27.06%  36.90%    1.01%  6.55%  30.90%  NA 
Per/Cross-sec  722/81  609/105  513/119  507/140    722/26  609/26  390/24  NA 
#Obs  41,646   45,175   50,419   54,385     13,721   12,359   5,007   NA 
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Table III 
Determinants of Excess Sovereign Bond Returns with Orthogonalized Credit Factor 
 
This table reports panel regression coefficients for the following model: 
#$%,&',( − #-.$( = * +CDEF-/0&',( − #-.$( + CGHIO∆.12P&',( +	CIJK∆23+%,&',( + <%,&',( 		 
where RB,, denotes the mid-price return for bond i issued by country cr on day t, RECB represents the 3 month ECB yield, EQT, is the country specific stock index return,	∆CDSO, is the 
change in country specific 5 year CDS spreads orthogonalized with respect to the other regressors,	∆Spr,, is the change in bond specific proportional bid-ask spread. We employ daily 
observations. For each sub-period, regressions variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% taking into account all time-series observations demeaned at the bond level. Sub-periods are from 01 Oct 
2004 to 31 Jul 2007 for the pre-crisis, from 01 Aug 2007 to 31 Dec 2009 for the subprime crisis; the sovereign crisis is split into two parts, from 01 Jan 2010 to 30 Dec 2011 and between 01 Jan 
2012 and 31 Dec 2013. White (1980) cross-section standard errors and covariances are used. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
  Panel A: Low Risk Countries (Germany, Netherlands and Finland)   Panel B: Medium Risk Countries (France, Austria and Belgium) 
Coefficient  
Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
  Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
CDEF   -0.024 ***  -0.061 ***  -0.101 ***  -0.068 ***    -0.033 ***  -0.059 ***  -0.052 ***  0.010 
CGHIO	  -0.283  0.893  1.483 ***  1.511 ***    -2.389 *  -0.381  -1.913 ***  -1.649 *** 
CIJK  -0.623  -0.228  -0.255  -0.046    -0.704  -0.138  -0.226 **  -0.026 
                  
Adj-R
2
  1.29%  12.13%  19.09%  6.14%    1.91%  10.29%  9.78%  3.57% 
Per/Cross-sec  643/73  609/84  513/98  507/111    722/68  609/75  513/86  507/108 
#Obs  30,455   35,932   36,737   43,689     33,323   37,427   36,464   42,724 
  Panel C: High Risk Countries (Italy, Ireland, Spain and Portugal)   Panel D: Greece 
Coefficient  
Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
  Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
CDEF   -0.024 ***  -0.039 ***  0.096 ***  0.171 ***    -0.018 ***  0.000  0.184 ***   NA 
CGHIO	  -0.454  -0.875 ***  -2.161 ***  -2.517 ***    0.669  -1.970 ***  -2.419 ***   NA 
CIJK  -1.442  -0.406 ***  -0.115 ***  -0.009    -0.642  -0.105 **  -0.076 ***   NA 
                  
Adj-R
2
  0.82%  6.15%  27.06%  36.90%    1.01%  6.55%  30.90%  NA 
Per/Cross-sec  722/81  609/105  513/119  507/140    722/26  609/26  390/24  NA 
#Obs  41,646   45,175   50,419   54,385     13,721   12,359   5,007   NA 
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Table IV 
Determinants of Excess Sovereign Bond Returns with Time-Varying Equity Beta 
This table reports the results of the following time series regression model estimated separately for each country:  
#$( − #-.$( = * + 456-/0( − #-.$(7 +89:
:
;: ∗ 6-/0( − #-.$(7 + <( 	
where #$, is the average daily mid-price return across all benchmark bonds available for a specific country on day t, RECBt represents the 3 month ECB yield, EQTt is the country specific 
stock index return and Xj represents the following macroeconomic and financial variables (details in Appendix A):  a country risk dummy (SovRisk) which takes the value 1 when the country’s 
5 year sovereign CDS exceeds 2%, output gap, changes in real GDP, changes in debt to GDP ratio, changes in retail sales, changes in unemployment, changes in consumer price index, changes 
in imports, changes in exports, changes in industrial production, changes in M3, changes in economic sentiment, changes in the orthogonalised credit default swap spread, ∆CDSOt, changes 
in average bid-ask spread across all benchmark bonds available for a specific country on day t, ∆Sprt, and the rolling 5-year correlation between industrial production growth and inflation, 
ρ6IP, Inf7t. Models I to V represent alternative specifications of the equation above. Model I does not consider any interaction terms. In Models II and III excess equity returns are interacted 
only by the country risk dummy and the correlation between industrial production growth and inflation, respectively. In Model IV we use all macro and financial variables excluding the 
country risk dummy. Finally, Model V includes all the macro and financial variables. In Models IV and V, we only report the coefficients for the excess equity return factor and the interacted 
country risk dummy and the industrial production growth - inflation correlation. The Wald test is used to assess whether the coefficients of other interacted factors are jointly equal to 0. We 
employ daily observations covering the period from 09 Sep 2004 to 31 Dec 2013. Regressions variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% on the following sub-periods: 01 Oct 2004 to 31 Jul 2007 
(pre-crisis), 01 Aug 2007 to 31 Dec 2009 (subprime crisis), 01 Jan 2010 to 30 Dec 2011 (sovereign debt crisis part I), and 01 Jan 2012 to 31 Dec 2013 (sovereign debt crisis part II). White (1980) 
cross-section standard errors and covariances are used. 
 Model I  Model II  Model III   
Country 45  Adj-R2  9IYZK%[\  45  Adj-R2  9ρ6IP,Inf7 45  Adj-R2  #Obs 
Germany -0.077 *** 18%  0.000 -0.077 *** 18%  -0.187 *** -0.070 *** 19%  2273 
Netherlands -0.075 *** 16%  0.000 -0.075 *** 16%  0.340 *** -0.089 *** 17%  2095 
Finland -0.056 *** 17%  0.000 -0.056 *** 17%  -0.085 ** -0.042 *** 17%  2209 
France -0.061 *** 11%  0.110 *** -0.066 *** 12%  -0.042 -0.058 *** 11%  2129 
Austria -0.041 *** 6%  0.041 -0.043 *** 6%  0.220 *** -0.047 *** 7%  2351 
Belgium -0.031 *** 2%  0.104 *** -0.048 *** 5%  0.434 *** -0.040 *** 4%  2351 
Italy 0.056 *** 6%  0.180 *** -0.016 *** 22%  -0.898 *** 0.106 *** 11%  2352 
Spain 0.044 *** 3%  0.192 *** -0.041 *** 18%  0.670 *** -0.002 8%  2352 
Portugal 0.064 *** 2%  0.223 *** -0.047 *** 8%  -0.835 *** 0.142 *** 3%  2351 
Ireland 0.007 0%  0.067 *** -0.019 *** 1%  0.391 0.042 ** 0%  1520 
Greece 0.066 *** 4%  0.175 *** -0.012 ** 12%  -0.650 *** 0.153 *** 8%  1715 
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Table IV - Continued 
 Model IV  Model V   
Country 
Wald F-stat 
∀9: = 0 excl. 	
9^6_,_`a7 & 
9bcde 
9^6_,_`a7 45 Adj-R2  
Wald F-stat 
∀9: = 0 excl. 	
9^6_,_`a7 & 
9bcde 
9^6_,_`a7 9bcde  45 Adj-R2  #Obs 
Germany 2.798*** -0.336 *** -0.062 *** 20%  2.798*** -0.336 *** 0.000 -0.062 *** 20%  2273 
Netherlands 2.445*** 0.454 *** -0.098 *** 18%  2.445*** 0.454 *** 0.000 -0.098 *** 18%  2095 
Finland 2.700*** -0.112 ** -0.031 *** 18%  2.700*** -0.112 ** 0.000 -0.031 *** 18%  2209 
France 1.438 0.051 -0.065 *** 11%  1.373 -0.014 0.118 *** -0.064 *** 13%  2129 
Austria 2.255*** 0.236 *** -0.050 *** 8%  2.192*** 0.227 *** 0.019 -0.051 *** 8%  2351 
Belgium 1.512 0.573 *** -0.041 *** 5%  1.288 0.300 *** 0.084 *** -0.046 *** 7%  2351 
Italy 5.664*** -1.178 *** 0.105 *** 16%  4.115*** -0.415 *** 0.169 *** 0.001 24%  2352 
Spain 8.092*** 0.261 ** 0.072 *** 14%  5.255*** -0.326 *** 0.183 *** -0.008 20%  2352 
Portugal 5.511*** -1.446 *** 0.152 *** 8%  4.220*** -0.545 ** 0.206 *** -0.018 11%  2351 
Ireland 2.078** -0.462 0.031 2%  1.512 -0.467 0.036 * 0.011 2%  1520 
Greece 6.828*** -0.377 ** 0.096 *** 20%  3.411*** -0.253 * 0.106 *** 0.052 ** 20%  1715 
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Table V 
Descriptive Statistics of Bond and Stock Portfolios 
This table presents the mean, standard deviation and correlations between four asset portfolios. LR_Stock and LR_Bond denote low risk stock and bond portfolios that include the stock 
market indices and average sovereign bond returns, respectively, of Germany, Finland and Netherlands. HR_Stock and HR_Bond are high risk stock and bond portfolios that include the stock 
market indices and average sovereign bond returns, respectively, of Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece. The mean return and standard deviation measures have been annualised from 
daily estimates. Sub-periods are from 01 Oct 2004 to 31 Jul 2007 for the pre-crisis, from 01 Aug 2007 to 31 Dec 2009 for the subprime crisis; the sovereign crisis is split into two parts, from 01 
Jan 2010 to 30 Dec 2011 and between 01 Jan 2012 and 31 Dec 2013. 
Panel A: Pre-crisis period   Panel B: Subprime crisis period 
 Mean 
Return 
 Standard 
Deviation 
 Correlations    Mean 
Return 
 Standard 
Deviation 
 Correlations 
   LR_Stock HR_Stock LR_Bond      LR_Stock HR_Stock LR_Bond 
LR_Stock 21.2%  12.6%       LR_Stock -11.8%  30.9%     
HR_Stock 19.7%  10.2%  88.3%     HR_Stock -19.8%  29.3%  91.0%   
LR_Bond -1.0%  2.5%  -14.9% -15.7%    LR_Bond 2.7%  4.2%  -45.7% -44.5%  
HR_Bond -1.4%   2.7%   -14.2% -14.5% 99.5%   HR_Bond 1.4%   4.4%   -30.9% -28.4% 87.9% 
Panel C: Sovereign crisis period I 
  
Panel D: Sovereign crisis period II 
 Mean 
Return 
 Standard 
Deviation 
 Correlations    Mean 
Return 
 Standard 
Deviation 
 Correlations 
   LR_Stock HR_Stock LR_Bond      LR_Stock HR_Stock LR_Bond 
LR_Stock -0.2%  23.1%       LR_Stock 18.7%  16.1%     
HR_Stock -21.5%  24.9%  86.6%     HR_Stock 17.1%  18.6%  77.3%   
LR_Bond 3.5%  4.4%  -61.0% -60.1%    LR_Bond -1.0%  3.7%  -35.6% -33.5%  
HR_Bond -12.3%   11.2%   27.6% 45.0% -19.6%   HR_Bond 13.2%   7.7%   40.0% 42.1% -17.6% 
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Table VI 
Portfolio Performance 
This table presents the modified Sharpe ratio (Israelsen 2005) of various investment strategies. Group bond/stock portfolio returns are obtained as an average of bond/stock portfolio 
returns belonging to the countries inside the group. Country-specific bond portfolio returns are estimated as return averages of all sovereign benchmark bonds of a country. The low risk 
group includes Germany, the Netherlands, and Finland while the high risk group is formed by Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and Greece. Excess returns are estimated using the 3 month 
ECB yield as a proxy for the risk-free rate.We employ daily observations. The full sample period covers 09 Sep 2004 to 31 Dec 2013 (FULL). Sub-periods are from 01 Oct 2004 to 31 Jul 2007 
for the pre-crisis (PRE), from 01 Aug 2007 to 31 Dec 2009 for the subprime crisis (SUB), from 01 Jan 2010 to 30 Dec 2011 and from 01 Jan 2012 to 31 Dec 2013 for the first (SOV I) and 
second (SOV II) part of the sovereign debt crisis, respectively. 
Portfolios Pre Sub Sov I Sov II Sov I + II Sub &  Sov I + II Full 
       
Stock low risk (SL) 1.46 -0.04 -0.00 1.15 0.44 0.01 0.27 
Stock high risk (SH) 1.66 -0.07 -0.05 0.92 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 
Bond low risk (BL) -0.00 0.06 0.67 -0.00 0.23 0.17 -0.00 
Bond high risk (BH) -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 1.72 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
        
Diversified fund (All) 1.26 -0.01 -0.01 1.34 0.17 -0.00 0.05 
High yield fund (SH&BH) 1.27 -0.02 -0.03 1.32 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 
Pension fund (SL&BL) 1.18 -0.01 0.11 1.15 0.54 0.04 0.25 
Equity fund (SL&SH) 1.60 -0.05 -0.03 1.09 0.16 -0.01 0.10 
Bond fund (BL&BH) -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 1.53 0.11 0.04 -0.00 
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Table VII  
 Determinants of Excess Sovereign Bond Returns: ECB’s Quantitative Easing and Money Supply Effects 
This table reports panel regression coefficients for the following model: 
#$%,&',( − #-.$( = * + CDEF-/0&',( −#-.$( + CGHIO∆.12P&',( +	CIJK∆23+%,&',( +	CDfKO	gh∆-i#P	j3( + Clmm>nnopn*qrqn, + CsFKOt0#PHfg +	CIgJ2j=Hfg 					
+ CGuJJ.$==Hfg + <%,&',( 		 
where RB,, denotes the mid-price return for bond i issued by country cr on day t, RECB represents the 3 month ECB yield, EQT, is the country specific stock index return,	∆CDSO, is the 
change in country specific 5 year CDS spreads orthogonalized with respect to the other continuous regressors,	∆Spr,, is the change in bond specific proportional bid-ask spread, 
Announcement is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 on dates when the ECB announces unconventional policy measures, LTRO|}  is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 on 
allotment dates for long-term refinancing operations with a maturity higher than 3 months, SMP|}and CBPP|} are dummy variables that take a value of 1 in the weeks (Securities Market 
Program) or days (Covered Bond Purchase Program) when securities were purchased by the ECB, ∆-i#P	j3( is the percentage change in the Euro Area monetary aggregate M3 (daily series is 
obtained by assuming each monthly change is realised equally, divide by 20, throughout the days of the month it covers). We employ daily observations. For each sub-period, regressions 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% taking into account all time-series observations demeaned at the bond level. Sub-periods are from 01 Oct 2004 to 31 Jul 2007 for the pre-crisis, from 01 
Aug 2007 to 31 Dec 2009 for the subprime crisis; the sovereign crisis is split into two parts, from 01 Jan 2010 to 30 Dec 2011 and between 01 Jan 2012 and 31 Dec 2013. White (1980) cross-
section standard errors and covariances are used. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
  Panel A: Low Risk Countries (Germany, Netherlands and Finland)   Panel B: Medium Risk Countries (France, Austria and Belgium) 
Coefficient  
Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
  Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
CDEF   -0.020 **  -0.036 ***  -0.101 ***  -0.066 ***    -0.031 ***  -0.028 ***  -0.053 ***  0.008 
CGHIO	  -0.267  0.847  1.462 ***  1.604 ***    -2.383 *  -0.330  -1.910 ***  -1.523 *** 
CIJK  -0.605  -0.283 *  -0.250  -0.028    -0.693  -0.185 *  -0.218 **  -0.030 
CDfKO	gh  0.001  0.010 ***  0.224  0.967 **    0.001  0.014 ***  1.412 **  1.181 ** 
                  
ECB Dummies  -  -  yes  yes   -  -  yes  yes 
Adj-R
2
  1.07%  13.62%  19.03%  6.39%    1.71%  12.79%  10.61%  4.02% 
Per/Cross-sec  643/73  609/84  513/98  507/111    722/68  609/75  513/86  507/108 
#Obs  30,455   35,932   36,737   43,689     33,323   37,427   36,464   42,724 
  Panel C: High Risk Countries (Italy, Ireland, Spain and Portugal)   Panel D: Greece 
Coefficient  
Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
  Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
CDEF   -0.015  -0.013 **  0.098 ***  0.170 ***    -0.013 **  0.020 ***  0.175 ***   NA 
CGHIO	  -0.467  -0.916 ***  -2.121 ***  -2.506 ***    0.640  -1.976 ***  -2.354 ***   NA 
CIJK  -1.429  -0.445 ***  -0.118 ***  -0.009    -0.659  -0.116 ***  -0.072 ***   NA 
CDfKO	gh  0.002  0.011 ***  1.181 *  -0.255    0.002 *  0.014 ***  -0.911   NA 
                  
ECB Dummies  -  -  yes  yes   -  -  yes  - 
Adj-R
2
  0.73%  8.15%  27.58%  36.95%    1.13%  9.71%  31.92%  NA 
Per/Cross-sec  722/81  609/105  513/119  507/140    722/26  609/26  390/24  NA 
#Obs  41,646   45,175   50,419   54,385     13,721   12,359   5,007   NA 
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Table VIII 
Determinants of Excess Sovereign Bond Returns with Flights-to-Safety 
This table reports panel regression coefficients for the following model: 
RB,, −RECB = c + βEQT, −RECB+ β∆CDSO, +	β∆Spr,, +	β	FTS, + ε,,		 
where RB,, denotes the mid-price return for bond i issued by country cr on day t, RECB represents the 3 month ECB yield, EQT, is the country specific stock index return,	∆CDSO, is the 
change in country specific 5 year CDS spreads orthogonalized with respect to the other regressors,	∆Spr,, is the change in bond specific proportional bid-ask spread, to*	02&',( is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of 1 on days when a flight-to-safety episode is observed. A flight-to-safety episode occurs when the return of the country specific 10Y bond portfolio > 2*StDev(10Y 
bond portfolio return, 2003 -2013) and the return of the stock market return < -2*StDev(stock market return, 2003 -2013). We employ daily observations. For each sub-period, regressions 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% taking into account all time-series observations demeaned at the bond level. Sub-periods are from 01 Oct 2004 to 31 Jul 2007 for the pre-crisis, from 01 
Aug 2007 to 31 Dec 2009 for the subprime crisis; the sovereign crisis is split into two parts, from 01 Jan 2010 to 30 Dec 2011 and between 01 Jan 2012 to 31 Dec 2013. White (1980) cross-section 
standard errors and covariances are used. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
  Panel A: Low Risk Countries (Germany, Netherlands and Finland)   Panel B: Medium Risk Countries (France, Austria and Belgium) 
Coefficient  
Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
  Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
CDEF   -0.024 ***  -0.055 ***  -0.094 ***  -0.068 ***    -0.033 ***  -0.054 ***  -0.044 ***  0.010 
CGHIO	  -0.283  0.835  1.464 ***  1.511 ***    -2.389 *  -0.480  -1.919 ***  -1.649 *** 
CIJK  -0.623  -0.241  -0.239  -0.046    -0.704  -0.152  -0.211 **  -0.026 
	CFI  Na  24.545 ***  19.287 ***  Na    Na  36.858 ***  44.259 ***  Na 
                   
Adj-R
2
  1.29%  12.84%  19.39%  6.14%    1.91%  11.16%  10.74%  3.57% 
Per/Cross-sec  643/73  609/84  513/98  507/111    722/68  609/75  513/86  507/108 
#Obs  30,455   35,932   36,737   43,689     33,323   37,427   36,464   42,724 
  Panel C: High Risk Countries (Italy, Ireland, Spain and Portugal)   Panel D: Greece 
Coefficient  
Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
  Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
CDEF   -0.024 ***  -0.037 ***  0.097 ***  0.171 ***    -0.018 ***  0.097 ***  0.185 ***   NA 
CGHIO	  -0.454  -0.901 ***  -2.131 ***  -2.517 ***    0.669  -2.131 ***  -2.443 ***   NA 
CIJK  -1.442  -0.410 ***  -0.113 ***  -0.009    -0.642  -0.113 ***  -0.081 ***   NA 
	CFI  Na  49.404 ***  137.507 ***  Na    Na  137.507 ***  594.467 ***  Na 
                   
Adj-R
2
  0.82%  6.57%  27.23%  36.90%    1.01%  27.23%  31.37%  NA 
Per/Cross-sec  722/81  609/105  513/119  507/140    722/26  513/119  390/24  NA 
#Obs  41,646   45,175   50,419   54,385     13,721   50,419   5,007   NA 
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Table IX 
Determinants of Excess Sovereign Bond Returns: International Risk Factor and Libor-OIS Spread 
This table shows panel regression coefficients for the following model: 
#$%,&',( −#-.$( = * + CDEF-/0&',( − #-.$(+ CGHIO∆.12P&',( +	CIJK∆23+%,&',( +	CFK∆?n,#( +	CsOI 	∆tP?2( + <%,&',( 		 
where RB,, denotes the bond mid-price return on day t for bond i issued by country cr, RECB represents the 3 month ECB yield, EQT, is the country specific stock index return,	∆CDSO, is 
the change in country specific 5 year CDS spreads orthogonalized with respect to all the other regressors, 	∆Spr,, is the change in bond specific proportional bid-ask spread,	∆IntR is the 
change in the international risk factor, and	∆LOIS is the change in the Libor-OIS spread. For each sub-period, regressions variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% taking into account all time-
series observations demeaned at the bond level. We employ daily observations. Sub-periods are from 01 Oct 2004 to 31 Jul 2007 for the pre-crisis, from 01 Aug 2007 to 31 Dec 2009 for the 
subprime crisis; the sovereign crisis is split into two parts, from 01 Jan 2010 to 30 Dec 2011 and from 01 Jan 2012 to 31 Dec 2013. White (1980) cross-section standard errors and covariances are 
used. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  Panel A: Low Risk Countries (Germany, Netherlands and Finland)   Panel B: Medium Risk Countries (France, Austria and Belgium) 
Coefficient  
Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
  Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
CDEF   -0.018 ***  -0.054 ***  -0.093 ***  -0.067 ***    -0.027 ***  -0.051 ***  -0.045 ***  0.010 
CGHIO	  -0.648  0.735  1.207 **  1.413 ***    -1.589  -0.439  -2.010 ***  -1.694 *** 
CIJK  -0.895  -0.252  -0.294  -0.087    -0.872  -0.160  -0.239 ***  -0.051 
CFK  -0.963 ***  -0.566 ***  0.308  -0.127   -1.311 ***  -0.711 ***  -0.119  0.328 
CsOI  3.871 ***  1.221 ***  2.241 ***  4.640 ***   4.519 ***  1.420 ***  2.385 ***  4.302 ** 
                  
Adj-R
2
  7.12%  14.22%  20.74%  7.00%    8.23%  13.00%  11.94%  4.60% 
Per/Cross-sec  643/73  609/84  513/98  507/111    722/68  609/75  513/86  507/108 
#Obs  30,455   35,932   36,737   43,689     33,323   37,427   36,464   42,724 
  Panel C: High Risk Credit Countries (Italy, Ireland, Spain and Portugal)   Panel D: Greece 
Coefficient  
Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
  Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
CDEF   -0.019 **  -0.033 ***  0.099 ***  0.171 ***    -0.016 ***  0.005  0.183 ***   NA 
CGHIO	  -0.049  -0.949 ***  -2.183 ***  -2.518 ***    0.752  -1.978 ***  -2.442 ***   NA 
CIJK  -1.449 *  -0.435 ***  -0.116 ***  -0.009    -0.723  -0.104 **  -0.078 ***   NA 
CFK  -1.121 ***  -0.669 ***  0.344  0.236   -1.082 ***  -0.719 ***  -0.673   NA 
CsOI  3.969 ***  1.241 ***  0.822  -2.318   3.698 ***  1.146 ***  -1.763   NA 
                  
Adj-R
2
  6.94%  8.89%  27.43%  36.92%    7.37%  8.50%  31.28%  NA 
Per/Cross-sec  722/81  609/105  513/119  507/140    722/26  609/26  390/24  NA 
#Obs  41,646   45,175   50,419   54,385     13,721   12,359   5,007   NA 
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Table X 
Correlation of Excess Sovereign Bond Returns and the Term Factor 
This table reports the correlation of the term factor, and its long term component, with country specific excess 
sovereign bond returns. The term factor is the difference between the return of a sovereign bond portfolio with 
a 10 year average maturity and the 3 month ECB rate. The term factor’s long term component is the return of 
the sovereign bond portfolio with a 10 year average maturity. Short, medium and long denote bonds with a 
remaining time-to-maturity of less than 3 years, between 3 and 7 years, and above 7 years, respectively. 
Correlations are estimate over the full sample period from 01 Oct 2004 to 31 Dec 2013. 
  Term Factor  
Term Factor’s  
Long Term Component 
  
Short 
Maturity  
 
Medium 
Maturity 
 
Long 
Maturity 
 
Short 
Maturity 
 
Medium 
Maturity 
 Long 
Maturity 
Germany  57.44%  89.19%  90.79%  57.45%  89.19%  90.78% 
Netherlands  55.09%  88.50%  89.44%  55.08%  88.48%  89.42% 
Finland  57.40%  85.93%  93.65%  57.36%  85.92%  93.59% 
France  57.89%  87.02%  87.54%  57.87%  87.01%  87.51% 
Austria  51.27%  83.33%  88.22%  51.26%  83.33%  88.20% 
Belgium  56.07%  82.69%  86.53%  56.07%  82.69%  86.53% 
Italy  68.14%  90.49%  92.07%  68.12%  90.48%  92.07% 
Spain  64.31%  88.94%  91.68%  64.29%  88.94%  91.67% 
Portugal  60.47%  83.52%  85.66%  60.46%  83.52%  85.66% 
Ireland  48.94%  72.67%  83.81%  48.94%  72.67%  83.81% 
Greece  42.81%  65.68%  54.29%  42.92%  65.69%  54.28% 
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Table XI  
Maturity Effects 
This table reports panel regression coefficients for the following model: 
#$%,&',( −#-.$( = * + CDEF-/0&',( −#-.$( ∗ 1ijIgs +CDEF-/0%,&',( −#-.$( ∗ 1ijgDH + CDEF-/0%,&',( −#-.$( ∗ 1ijs + CGHIO∆.12P&',( +	CIJK∆23+%,&',( + <%,&',( 		 
where RB,, denotes the mid-price return for bond i issued by country cr on day t, RECB represents the 3 month ECB yield, EQT, is the country specific stock index return, ∆.12P&',( 	is the 
change in country specific 5 year CDS spreads orthogonalized with respect to all the other regressors,	∆Spr,, is the change in bond specific percentage bid-ask spread. We employ daily 
observations. For each sub-period, regressions variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% taking into account all time-series observations demeaned at the bond level. Sub-periods are from 01 Oct 
2004 to 31 Jul 2007 for the pre-crisis, from 01 Aug 2007 to 31 Dec 2009 for the subprime crisis; the sovereign crisis is split into two parts, from 01 Jan 2010 to 30 Dec 2011 and from 01 Jan 2012 
to 31 Dec 2013. White (1980) cross-section standard errors and covariances are used. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
  Panel A: Low Risk Countries (Germany, Netherlands and Finland)   Panel B: Medium Risk Countries (France, Austria and Belgium) 
Coefficient  
Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
  Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
CDEF   -0.006 ***  -0.020 ***  -0.019 ***  -0.006 ***    -0.008 ***  -0.020 ***  -0.007 *  0.004 * 
CDEF   -0.028 ***  -0.066 ***  -0.089 ***  -0.045 ***    -0.031 ***  -0.058 ***  -0.028 ***  0.015 * 
CDEF   -0.044 ***  -0.099 ***  -0.215 ***  -0.142 ***    -0.048 ***  -0.076 ***  -0.107 ***  0.010 
                  
Adj-R
2
  1.92%  15.55%  30.67%  10.31%    2.20%  11.62%  13.12%  3.77% 
Per/Cross-sec  643/73  609/84  513/98  507/111    722/68  609/75  513/86  507/108 
#Obs  30,455   35,932   36,737   43,689     33,323   37,427   36,464   42,724 
  Panel C: High Risk Countries (Italy, Ireland, Spain and Portugal)   Panel D: Greece 
Coefficient  
Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
  Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
CDEF   -0.007 ***  -0.016 ***  0.052 ***  0.068 ***    -0.005 ***  -0.001  0.110 ***   NA 
CDEF   -0.026 ***  -0.043 ***  0.099 ***  0.176 ***    -0.016 ***  -0.002  0.214 ***   NA 
CDEF   -0.038 ***  -0.052 ***  0.130 ***  0.261 ***    -0.031 ***  0.004  0.218 ***   NA 
                  
Adj-R
2
  1.00%  7.01%  28.12%  40.74%    1.37%  6.57%  31.67%  NA 
Per/Cross-sec  722/81  609/105  513/119  507/140    722/26  609/26  390/24  NA 
#Obs  41,646   45,175   50,419   54,385     13,721   12,359   5,007   NA 
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Table XII 
Determinants of Excess Sovereign Bond Returns: Schwarz (2016) Illiquidity Measure 
 
This table reports panel regression coefficients for the following model: 
#$%,&',( − #-.$( = * + CDEF-/0&',( −#-.$( + CGHIO∆.12P&',( +	CIJK∆23+%,&',( +	CI&'(∆2*ℎ+,( + <%,&',( 		 
where RB,, denotes the mid-price return for bond i issued by country cr on day t, RECB represents the 3 month ECB yield, EQT, is the country specific stock index return,	∆CDSO, is the 
change in country specific 5 year CDS spreads orthogonalized with respect to the other regressors,	∆Spr,, is the change in bond specific proportional bid-ask spread, and ∆Schwarz refers to 
the change in yields between portfolios of KfW bonds and German sovereign bonds with an approximate time-to-maturity of 5 years (i.e. 4.5 – 5.5 years). We employ daily observations.  For 
each sub-period, regressions variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% taking into account all time-series observations demeaned at the bond level. Sub-periods are from 01 Oct 2004 to 31 Jul 
2007 for the pre-crisis, from 01 Aug 2007 to 31 Dec 2009 for the subprime crisis; the sovereign crisis is split into two parts, from 01 Jan 2010 to 30 Dec 2011 and from 01 Jan 2012 to 31 Dec 
2013. White (1980) cross-section standard errors and covariances are used. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
  Panel A: Low Risk Countries (Germany, Netherlands and Finland)   Panel B: Medium Risk Countries (France, Austria and Belgium) 
Coefficient  
Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
  Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
CDEF   -0.024 ***  -0.037 ***  -0.067 ***  -0.042 ***    -0.033 ***  -0.034 ***  -0.032 ***  0.006 
CGHIO	  -0.252  0.556  0.687 *  0.367    -2.422 *  -0.502  -2.172 ***  -1.743 *** 
CIJK  -0.648  -0.380 **  -0.312  -0.109    -0.717  -0.258 ***  -0.223 **  -0.013 
CSchwarz   0.733  4.873 ***  5.130 ***  4.064 ***    0.301  5.336 ***  2.965 ***  -0.554 
                  
Adj-R
2
  1.31%  21.68%  26.74%  10.33%    1.91%  20.15%  13.33%  3.66% 
Per/Cross-sec  643/73  609/84  513/98  507/111    722/68  609/75  513/86  507/108 
#Obs  30,455   35,932   36,737   43,689     33,323   37,427   36,464   42,724 
  Panel C: High Risk Countries (Italy, Ireland, Spain and Portugal)   Panel D: Greece 
Coefficient  
Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
  Pre-crisis 
period 
 
Subprime crisis 
period 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period I 
 
Sovereign crisis 
period II 
CDEF   -0.024 ***  -0.021 ***  0.075 ***  0.151 ***    -0.018 ***  0.012 *  0.151 ***   NA 
CGHIO	  -0.449  -0.977 ***  -2.169 ***  -2.490 ***    0.657  -2.059 ***  -2.358 ***   NA 
CIJK  -1.430  -0.482 ***  -0.115 ***  -0.008    -0.627  -0.122 ***  -0.070 ***   NA 
CSchwarz   -0.204  3.728 ***  -3.259 ***  -4.376 ***    -0.892  3.493 ***  -11.608 ***   NA 
                  
Adj-R
2
  0.82%  12.06%  27.06%  36.95%    1.05%  10.67%  31.05%  NA 
Per/Cross-sec  722/81  609/105  513/119  507/140    722/26  609/26  390/24  NA 
#Obs  41,646   45,175   50,419   54,385     13,721   12,359   5,007   NA 
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The Equity-like Behaviour of Sovereign Bonds  
 
Highlights 
1. We study the determinants of European sovereign bond returns 
2. The sign of the equity beta of bond returns depends on country risk 
3. The equity beta becomes positive when sovereign credit spreads exceed 2% 
4. In a crisis, government bonds of high risk countries behave like equities 
5. “Prudent diversification” appears to offer superior risk adjusted returns 
 
 
